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Abstract
We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities
in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities
naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic con-
texts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction
among bidders after the auction has closed. The endogeneity of valua-
tions is the main driving force behind many new, specific phenomena
with allocative externalities: even in complete information settings,
traditional auction formats need not be efficient, and they may give
rise to multiple equilibria and strategic non-participation. But, in the
absence of informational externalities, welfare maximization can be
achieved by Vickrey-Clarke- Groves mechanisms. Welfare-maximizing
Bayes-Nash implementation is, however, impossible in multi-object
settings with informational externalities, unless the allocation problem
is separable across objects (e.g. there are no allocative externalities
nor complementarities) or signals are one-dimensional. Moreover, im-
plementation of any choice function via ex-post equilibrium is generi-
cally impossible with informational externalities and multidimensional
types. A theory of information constraints with multidimensional sig-
nals is rather complex, but indispensable for our study.
1 Introduction
General equilibrium analysis has identified several forms of externalities as
obstacles on the road towards economic efficiency. It is well known that the
First Welfare Theorem may fail to hold in the presence of allocative exter-
nalities, i.e., when agents care about the physical consumption bundles of
∗Invited lecture at the World Congress of the Econometric Society, London , 2005.
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others. Akerlof’s (1970) famous analysis demonstrated that the First Wel-
fare Theorem may also fail in the presence of informational externalities, i.e.,
when agents care about the information held by others.
In contrast to general equilibrium analysis, auction theory is based on the
premise of individual strategic behavior. This theory offers explicit models
of price formation and allocative distribution that can be applied also to
small markets. The belief that auctions yield competitive outcomes even
if information is dispersed is behind the practical appeal of auctions, and
behind their recent popularity.
Since, as mentioned above, Walrasian equilibria need not be efficient in
the presence of various forms of externalities, it is of interest to understand
what are the parallel consequences of external effects in auctions, and in other
related mechanisms. This is the main purpose of the research summarized
in the present paper.
Traditionally, the focus of auction theory has been on models that view
auctions as isolated events. In practice, however, auctions are often part of
larger transactions: for example, in privatization exercises such as license
allocation schemes (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2003, and the surveys in
Janssen, 2004), auctions or other mechanisms shape the size and compo-
sition of future markets. Thus the auction typically affects the nature of
the post-auction interaction among bidders. On the other hand, anticipated
scenarios about the future interaction influence bidding behavior: already at
the bidding stage agents need to care about who gets what, and about the
information revealed to, or possessed by others, since these features will be
reflected in the equilibrium of the post-auction interaction. Thus, we want to
stress here that allocative and informational externalities naturally arise in
models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. This, in our view,
constitutes the main motivation for the present study.
In Section 2 we present a social choice model with a finite number of
alternatives that includes, as a special case, a general multi-object auction
model where the alternatives are partitions of objects among agents. The
model can incorporate allocative and informational externalities, as well as
complementarities. We also sketch a typical application to license auctions.
In Section 3 we focus on the effects created by allocative externalities.
The induced endogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind a
wealth of new, specific phenomena. Generally speaking, traditional auc-
tion formats need not be efficient. They may give rise to the possibilities
of strategic non-participation and multiple equilibria with varied outcomes,
thereby suggesting that the outcomes of auctions are hard to predict. We
also note that the presence of allocative externalities may be responsible for
the emptiness of the core, thereby suggesting another channel through which
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allocative externalities are an important source of (coalitional) instability.
We also discuss the use of optimal threats in revenue maximization, and the
severe conflicts that may arise among various designer’s goals, such as welfare
maximization and revenue maximization. We note that more flexible auction
formats need not be preferable as they may allow bidders to achieve more
concentrated market structures.
We also show that in environments with limited commitment abilities, re-
sale markets ensure that in the long run the welfare performance is unaffected
by the initial allocation of property rights (if agents are patient enough). But
the final outcome induced by the resale markets need not be efficient, thereby
suggesting that a desirable initial allocation coupled with restrictions on the
resale markets may be preferable. Finally, we briefly survey a variety of
recent applications.
In Section 4 we add private information about values, and we study multi-
object auction models without informational externalities (these are so called
private values models). The analysis focuses on dominant strategy mecha-
nisms that achieve desirable goals such as value maximization for buyers, or
revenue maximization for the seller. In particular, welfare-maximization is
achieved by the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms even in the
presence of allocative externalities.
We also discuss how other dominant strategy mechanisms, not necessarily
welfare maximizing, can be characterized in such frameworks. An application
is made to revenue boosting via mixed bundling in auctions for several het-
erogenous objects. Note that the revenue-maximizing auction in this setting
is still unknown.
In Section 5 the emphasis is on informational externalities, and on several
impossibility results in such frameworks. We start with technical observa-
tions that are needed for the proofs of our general impossibility results. In
order to consistently and generally model the preferences of bidders, pri-
vate signals must be vectors rather than scalars. This feature distinguishes
our framework from most auction models for a single object (that were the
traditional domain of much of auction theory) that generally assumed one-
dimensional private information1. Analyzing incentive constraints with mul-
tidimensional signals is technically complex, but indispensable. For the gen-
eral social choice model developed in Section 2 we characterize Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible mechanisms under the assumption that signals are in-
dependent. A main new requirement is that equilibrium utility (as a function
1For one-object auction models that allow for several informational dimensions (e.g.,
on a private value component and common value component), see, among others, Maskin
(1992), Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1998), Compte and Jehiel (2002a), and Jackson (2003).
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of type) is a convex potential. Immediate corollaries are general payoff and
revenue equivalence theorems.
We next proceed to show that Bayes-Nash implementation of the welfare-
maximizing choice function is impossible in generic settings with multidimen-
sional signals, and, moreover, that robust implementation of any non-trivial
choice function is generically impossible. In particular, welfare-maximizing
multi-object auctions do not exist, unless the allocation problem is separable
across objects (e.g., there are neither allocative externalities nor comple-
mentarities) or signals are one-dimensional. Here (as in Section 4) robust
implementation refers to implementation via mechanisms that do not finely
depend on the beliefs of the agents or designer. In contexts with informational
externalities, the relevant concept is the ex-post equilibrium: It is shown that
no social choice rule that makes use of the private information can be ex post
implemented, as soon as two agents have at least two dimensions of private
information. These results are in sharp contrast with the finding obtained
in the private values setup (Section 4), and illustrate the complex effects
of the combination of allocative and informational externalities on mecha-
nisms. We also identify non-generic settings where ex-post implementation
and ex-post welfare-maximization are possible, and we mention several recent
applications. Section 6 concludes.
We want to emphasize here that the present paper is not meant to be a
survey of auction theory and mechanism design: there is a wealth of inter-
esting and relevant issues that will not be addressed here. Interested readers
can consult, for example, Klemperer (1999).
2 A General Multi-Object Auction Model
We start with a general social choice model with N +1 agents, indexed by
i = 0, 1, 2, ..N and K social alternatives, indexed by k = 1, 2, ..K. Each
agent gets a private signal about the state of the world θi ∈ Θi ⊆ <m. We
denote θ = (θ0, θ1, ...θN), Θ = ×Ni=0Θi, θ−i = (θ0, ..., θi−1, θi+1, ..., θN) and so
on...
Agents have quasi-linear utility functions that depend on the chosen al-
ternative, on private signals, and on monetary payments: if alternative k is
chosen, and if agent i obtains a monetary transfer2 ti, then her utility is given
by
2More generally, agent i0 s utility may depend also on monetary transfers made to other
players. These are situations with ”financial externalities”. We do not include them in
our present analysis. The reader interested in the effect of such externalities on auctions
should consult Dasgupta and Tsui (2004), Ettinger (2002) and Goeree et al. (2004).
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ui(k, θ, ti) = vik(θ
0, θ1, ...θN) + ti
where vik may a priori be any function of (θ
0, θ1, ...θN).
The special case of auctions is included as follows: A set of M objects
(possibly heterogenous) is allocated among a seller (who will be called agent
zero) and N potential buyers. Here a social alternative is a partition of the
goods among the agents: P = (P0, P1, ..PN), where Pi represents the bundle
allocated to agent i. Let P denote the set of all partitions.
For each partition P , agent i obtains a signal θiP that influences values for
that partition. Thus θi = (θiP )P∈P , and we write v
i
P (θ) = v
i
P (θ
0
P , .., θ
N
P ). This
specification includes a large variety of auction / mechanism design models
studied in the literature. Here are a few prominent examples:
1. For any partitions P and P 0 such that Pi = P 0i assume that θ
i
P = θ
i
P 0 ≡
θiPi , and v
i
P (θ) = v
i
P 0(θ) ≡ viPi(θ
i
Pi
). This is a ”pure private values”
model where agent i only cares about the bundle allocated to her in
each partition, and about a signal pertaining to that bundle. There are
neither allocative nor informational externalities.
2. For any θ and θ0 such that θiP = θ
0i
P , assume that v
i
P (θ) = v
i
P (θ
0) ≡
viP (θ
i
P ). This is a model where agent i only cares about his own signal
about the partition, (i.e., there are no informational externalities), but
imay care about the entire partition of objects (i.e., there are allocative
externalities)
3. For any partitions P and P 0 such that Pi = P 0i assume that v
i
P (θ) =
viP 0(θ). It follows that θ
j can be re-parameterized as θj = (θjX)X∈2M
where X is a subset of the M objects, and viP (θ) can be re-written
as viPi(θ
0
Pi
, ..., θNPi). This is a model where agent i only cares about the
bundle allocated to him in each partition (i.e., there are no allocative
externalities), but i does care about the information about that bundle
available to other agents (i.e., there are informational externalities).
4. viP (θ) depends in a general way on the entire partition P and on the
entire profile of signals θ. This is the most general model that admits
both allocative and informational externalities.
5. Assume that there are no allocative externalities. If viPi∪P 0i
(·) > (<)
viPi(·) + viP 0i (·) for some bundles of object Pi, P
0
i , then this is a model
that exhibits complementarities (substitutabilities).
5
2.1 A Typical Application
There are many applications in which both allocative and informational ex-
ternalities naturally arise in auction contexts. Allocative externalities often
arise because bidders care about the ensuing market structure that is af-
fected by the auction’s outcome (or who gets what). Informational external-
ities arise because private information on the cost structure typically affects
the competitors’ profits. Information is naturally multi-dimensional because
there are various aspects to the cost structure and different objects for sale.
As an illustration, consider the recent European process of allocating
UMTS licenses to telecom firms (for surveys see, among others, Jehiel and
Moldovanu, 2003 and Klemperer, 2002). The allocation proceeded via a
sequence of national auctions and beauty contests. This was a complicated
process with a variety of aspects not directly connected to auctions. We focus
below only on the basic features that parallel those in the model sketched
above.
1. The auctioned objects were licenses to operate a third-generation mo-
bile telephony network in a certain country. The licenses differed in a
multitude of dimensions such as the size and distribution of the popula-
tion, spectrum capacity, duration, required investment size and deploy-
ment speed, and many other physical or regulatory constraints. Some
of the participating firms were small and had only national interests,
while most of the bigger firms competed continent-wide. Thus, both
auctioned objects and bidders were heterogenous, and bidders had to
aggregate various dimensions of information.
2. To a large extent, national licenses were substitutes (and firms were
generally not allowed to buy more than one license in each country),
while licenses in various countries were complements (since they allow,
among other things, integrated and seamless service, roaming, billing,
etc... within one large network, and they offer more bargaining power
versus equipment producers and regulators)
3. The value of a bundle of licenses for a given firm equals, basically,
the expected revenue in the future telecom market from holding that
bundle, minus the required infrastructure and operation costs. In any
reasonable scenario for the future telecom market, the expected profits
crucially depend on the number of licenses (or competitors) within one
country, on their identity (e.g., small local firms or large supranational
ones), on the license holdings of competitors in other countries (that
determine what integrated services they can offer), and so on... Thus,
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a major feature of the license allocation example is the presence of
allocative externalities among bidders3.
4. Private information is multidimensional since many types of licenses
were sold (see also point 1 above), and since the bidding firms had het-
erogenous assessments about technical network requirements, present
and future regulatory frameworks, future demand characteristics, fu-
ture operation costs, future technological developments, etc... All these
factors influence future revenue and costs, and thus valuations.
5. In any reasonable oligopoly scenario, competitors’ cost parameters4
affect one own’s profit. Since competitors have some information about
their operation method, future technological development and future
demand, the auctions also involved informational externalities.
3 Allocative Externalities
In this section we review design issues that are related to the presence of al-
locative externalities. In order to abstract from other effects, we first assume
that there is complete information, and we come back later to the additional
phenomena due to asymmetric information.
We illustrate a number of insights through the following situation appear-
ing in Industrial Organization models: There are N potentially active firms
in the market. An innovation protected by a patent is auctioned among the
firms. The acquiring firm is able to produce at a lower cost, but the magni-
tude of the cost reduction may depend on the identity of the acquiring firm.
Let vii denote the change in profit of firm i if i acquires the innovation; v
i
i
is referred to as i’s valuation. Let vji denote the change of profit of firm j
when firm i acquires the innovation. This change of profit is caused by the
modified oligopolistic competition after the innovation is introduced (which
is typically less favorable for j). We refer to vji as the externality exerted
by i on j. This specification fits into the general model presented above by
noting that, in the case of one single object, the partition P can be simply
described by the firm i who acquires the innovation.
3The sellers (i..e, the national governments) had also preferences involving allocative
externalities since they were concerned with consumer welfare. Thus they cared about
how many licenses are awarded, how many of them are bought by new entrants, who are
the wining firms (local or foreign, etc...).
4This is just an example; information about demand parameters is another.
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3.1 Endogenous Valuations
Assume that the innovation is auctioned using a second-price sealed-bid auc-
tion5. That is, each firm i submits a bid bi, and the firm with highest bid
wins the auction and pays the second highest bid. Ties are resolved as usual.
In the traditional setup without externalities, it is a (weakly) dominant
strategy for firms to bid their values for the auctioned object (see Vickrey,
1961). Here, the mere notion of value is not well defined. Indeed, how much
i is willing to pay in order to win very much depends on her expectation
about who is going to win if she does not. For example, if i expects j to win
her net value of winning (compared to the loss scenario) is vii− vij. Similarly,
if i expects k to win her value is vii− vik. These two values need not coincide,
and thus it is impossible to say how much i values the innovation, inde-
pendently of her expectations over alternative market scenarios. Of course,
expectations must be consistent with equilibrium play. The observation that
valuations depend here on expectations translates into the possibility of mul-
tiple equilibria with quite different outcomes:
Example 1 (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1996) Let N = 3,and let vii = v for
all i. Let the externality terms be: v21 = v
1
2 = −α, v31 = v32 = −γ , and
v13 = v
2
3 = −β where α > γ > β > 0. It is readily verified that, in one
equilibrium, firms 1 and 2 compete with each other (since they are very afraid
of each other). The resulting outcome is that either firm 1 or 2 wins the
auction and pays v + α. In another equilibrium, 1 and 3 are in competition.
The resulting outcome is that 3 wins the auction (because 3 is more afraid of
1 than 1 is afraid of 3, e.g. γ > β) and pays v + β - a much lower price
than in the previous equilibrium. Firm 2 is not willing to outbid 3 because 2
is not that afraid of 3.
3.2 Strategic Non-Participation
In auctions without externalities, not participating in the auction is equiv-
alent to participating and making an irrelevant bid6. In the presence of
externalities, this is no longer the case. By staying out, a bidder may induce
an outcome that turns out to be more favorable to her than the outcome
that would have arisen if she had participated (see Jehiel and Moldovanu,
1996). We illustrate it through the following example:
Example 2 (Hoppe, Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2005) Let N = 3. Firms 1, 2
are incumbents, while firm 3 is a potential entrant. The incumbents do not
5The same insights apply to all other standard formats.
6Participation costs are assumed to be nul.
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value the object (innovation, license, etc...) per se: v11 = v
2
2 = 0. Moreover,
v21 = v
1
2 = 0. The entrant has value v
3
3 = v , and it creates an externality
v13 = v
2
3 = −α on incumbents. We assume that v < α. We now check why
there is no equilibrium where all three firms participate in the auction: If all
three firms participate, there are, essentially, three possible bidding equilibria:
two in pure strategy, one in mixed strategy. In a pure strategy equilibrium,
one of the incumbents, say firm 1, wins and pays v. In this equilibrium firm
2 bids zero since there is no point winning: that outcome is equivalent to the
outcome when she lets 1 win. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, firms 1 and
2 mix between a bid of zero (say), and a bid slightly above v, and the entrant
sometimes wins. The strategic interaction between the incumbent firms re-
sembles a war of attrition: each incumbent is willing to deter entry (since α
is large), but prefers that the other incumbent pays the price v of entry de-
terrence. Assume then that all firms participate, and that one of the above
bidding equilibria is played. At least one incumbent, say 1, wins at price v
with positive probability. But, 1 would be strictly better off by not participat-
ing in the auction. Indeed, in that case, the auction is among bidders 2 and
3, and 2 wins because α > v. Clearly, firm 1 benefits from such a deviation:
entry is deterred and firm 1 pays nothing for it. Thus, in any equilibrium, at
least one of the firms will choose not to participate with positive probability7.
In Hoppe, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2005), we build on Example 2 to show
that increasing the number of objects may change the nature of the inter-
action between the incumbents. When two objects are auctioned, the two
incumbents have an easy way to collude within the auction: each buys one
object at price v, thereby deterring entry. If allowing two entries is also an
equilibrium, the two-object auction resembles now a coordination game be-
tween the two incumbents, rather than a war of attrition (as in the one-object
auction). This is somewhat reminiscent of the finding that, in multi-object
auctions, collusion may mean sharing the items for sale (see Wilson 1979).
But, the channel through which this occurs here is specific to the presence
of allocative externalities.
3.3 Participation Decisions and Optimal Mechanisms
We considered above standard auction formats. We wish now to analyze
how the auction designer can exploit the bidders’ participation decisions in
7The argument assumes that the set of participants is public information. One way to
avoid strategic non-participation is to keep the set of bidders secret. But, such policies
may have other drawbacks (see Compte and Jehiel, 2002b and DasVarma, 2002).
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order to increase her revenue. The key observation is that, by augmenting
the auction design by appropriate threats, the designer is able to extract
payments also from bidders who do not win. This subsection summarizes
insights from Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) (see also Kamien,
Oren and Tauman 1992 for an early analysis of a setting where non-acquirers
make payments to the auctioneer).
Assume that all externalities are negative, i.e., vji ≤ 0 for all i, j 6= i.
If firm i stays out, the worst scenario for firm i would be that the winner
is firm j(i) where j(i) ∈ argminj vij. We let vi = minj 6=i vij, and augment
the mechanism by the specification that if agent i does not participate, the
winner is firm j(i). In line with the mechanism design literature we assume
first that the designer has the commitment power to implement such threats.
If firm i refuses to participate, it will get a minimal payoff. In equilib-
rium8, all firms participate, and the outcome is chosen so as to maximize
welfare. This is so because the designer can internalize social welfare by
asking every firm i to pay the difference between i’s payoff in the welfare
maximizing outcome and vi.
Proposition 3 The outcome of the revenue maximizing mechanism also
maximizes welfare for the agents. The extracted revenue is:
R = −
X
i
vi +max
(
0,max
i
X
j
vji
)
The above argument can be viewed as an expression of the celebrated
Coase theorem in our setup9. Observe that, in the presence of allocative
externalities, as soon as there are at least three bidders, welfare is usually
not maximized by standard auctions.
To illustrate Proposition 3, consider example 2 again. Given that v < α,
the outcome that maximizes welfare (among agents) is that the object is sold
to either incumbent (or, equivalently, that the seller keeps the object). The
threat to either incumbent is that, if either of them refuses to participate, the
object is sold to the entrant. The entrant is not threatened. Each incumbent
is willing to pay α to avoid entry, and the revenue to the designer is:10 2α.
8There could, a priori, be other equilibria where several firms decide not to participate.
But, by suitably defining what the mechanism does when several firms do not participate,
one can guarantee that participation is a weakly dominant strategy. (see Jehiel et al.,
1996).
9This holds despite the fact that the participation constraints are endogenous, unlike
those in Coase’s original analysis. The point is that reservation values can be set indepen-
dently of the chosen outcome.
10If we restrict attention to mechanisms where only the winner can make payments, the
revenue falls down to α.
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More generally, if the designer also cares about consumers’ surplus and
not only about revenue, then total welfare will be maximized in equilibrium,
and the payoff of the designer will:
W = −
X
i
vi +max
(
0,max
i
(
X
j
vji + CSi)
)
where CSi is the change in consumers’ surplus resulting from a sale to firm
i.
3.4 Credibility and Resale
The mechanism design approach assumes a high commitment power on the
designer’s part. In the above application, the designer can commit to per-
sonalized and fine-tuned threats. What happens if the commitment power is
limited? In Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999) we consider11 a model where firms
can sell and further resell the object before a (sufficiently far away) deadline
T , at which time the current owner of the good must use it. We assume
that agents are unable to commit to actions at future stages (in particular,
they are unable to commit not to resell, or to sell to a specific agent if some
pre-specified event occurs). At each stage, the current owner makes an offer
to a set of agents. The offer may include a sale in exchange for payments.
If an approached agent refuses the deal, one period of time elapses, and the
owner makes a new offer. The main finding of Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999)
is:
Proposition 4 : The identity of the initial owner does not affect the identity
of the agent who consumes at date T . The consumer at date T need not
maximize total welfare unless all agents have veto power over all transactions.
The following example illustrates the result:
Example 5 Let N = 4, and let T ≥ 2. The values are: v11 = 6.5, v22 = 10.1,
v33 = 9, v
4
4 = 7; v
2
1 = v
3
1 = v
4
1 = 0; v
1
2 = v
3
2 = −1, v42 = −2; v13 = −2,
v23 = 0, v
4
3 = −1; v14 = v24 = 0, v34 = −1. The welfare maximizing firm is 1.
But, no matter who the initial owner is, the object will be consumed by firm
2 at stage T. At stage T −1, firm 1 sells to 2 without extracting any payment
from 3 and 4 because these prefer that 1 is the final owner rather than 2.
Firm 2 sells to 3 while extracting v43 − v42 = 1 from 4. Firm 3 sells to 2 while
11See also Brocas (2003) for a study of an auction with negative externalities where the
seller has no credible threats.
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Figure 1:
extracting v12 − v13 = 1 from 1.Firm 4 sells to 2 without extra payments from
1 and 3. At stage T − 2, firms 1 and 3 do not sell. Firm 2 sells to 4 while
extracting v12 − v13 = 1 from firm 1. Firm 4 sells to 3 without extra payment
from firms 1 and 2. At stage T − 3 and any earlier stages, no matter who is
the current owner, the innovation ends up in the hands of firm 2 at stage T .
A main feature of the above equilibrium is that, at some stages, firms that
oppose the deal are simply excluded from the agreement. It can be showed
that if one introduces veto power (i.e., all agents must agree to a change of
ownership) the outcome maximizes welfare.
When resale cannot be forbidden, the above result suggests that it is
welfare irrelevant how the initial property rights are assigned: eventually
the same final physical outcome results. But, it is erroneous to conclude
that mechanism design is irrelevant. Indeed, the final outcome need not be
efficient. Thus, it may be a good idea to try to allocate the object efficiently
in the first place, and then control the resale market to some extent12.
There are several limitations to the above model: 1) The result relies on
the existence of a deadline13; 2) There is only good for sale; 3) Only the
current owner is able to make proposals. Gomes and Jehiel (2005) were able
to generalize the main result without these assumptions. They also show
that efficiency must occur in the long run if the efficient allocation of goods
12An extreme option is to forbid resales, as was done in the case of spectrum license
auctions.
13Chien (2004) analyzes the same model with an infinite horizon and focuses on the
resulting differences.
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is such that no group of agents can force a move to another allocation that
hurts i without her consent.
3.5 Core and Externalities
We make now a brief detour to show that, from the viewpoint of coalitional
deviations, the presence of allocative externalities is a source of instability.
The following result is a corollary of Proposition 6 in Jehiel and Moldovanu
(1996).
Proposition 6 Suppose that welfare is maximized by letting firm i∗ buy the
object . If there exists a subset T of buyers, i∗ /∈ T, and a buyer i ∈ T such
that14 X
j∈T∪{i∗}
vji∗ <
X
j∈T∪{i∗}
vji (1)
then the core of the associated market with externalities is empty15.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows: stability against coalitional
deviations requires welfare maximization, so that in any core outcome the
object is sold to i∗. Buyers j 6= i∗ can always refuse to make any payment,
and buyers j 6= i are thus assured to get at least
X
j 6=i∗
vji∗ collectively. Buyer
j cannot get strictly more than vji∗ as otherwise the coalition of the seller
and firm i∗ could do better by just ignoring j. Thus, j must get exactly vji∗.
Thus, if condition (1) holds, the coalition of the seller and buyers in T ∪{i∗}
can improve on the candidate core allocation by re-allocating the object to
i rather than i∗. It follows that the core must be empty when condition (1)
holds.
Ranger (2005) generalizes the Ausubel-Milgrom (2002) ascending proxy
auction for several objects to a framework with allocative externalities (see
also Lamy, 2005), and shows that the outcome must be in the ”core” of the
market. This looks puzzling, since, as we just showed, the core is often empty
14When condition (1) holds, the welfare maximizing state i∗ is not negative externality-
free (see Gomes and Jehiel 2005) since the coalition of the seller and buyers in T can
allocate the innovation to firm i , hurting agents outside T ∪ {i∗} . The spoliation is the
key reason for the inexistence of a stable outcome.
15With externalities , the core notion depends on assumptions about reactions to coali-
tional deviations by agents in the complement. Our result holds for the most permissive
definition, the α-core, where the complement is assumed to choose the worst course of
action from the point of view of the deviators. Any core is empty if the α−core is.
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when there are (negative) externalities. The point is that Ranger’s notion
of core restricts what coalitions can do. For example, side-payments (e.g.,
compensation) among bidders are not allowed in his model.
3.6 The Conflict between Welfare and Revenue
In this subsection, we briefly consider an auction where the number of auc-
tioned objects is endogenously determined by the bidders’ behavior, and
where externalities are created by the effects on downstream payoffs16.
Conventional wisdom suggests that disaggregating spectrum, say, into
small capacity blocks, and letting the bidders aggregate the blocks to form
licenses of whatever capacity they need is a good idea. After all, the designer
is usually not knowledgeable about how much the firms value the licenses, or
about how valuable extra capacity is. But, this argument ignores the possibil-
ity that the auction’s flexibility may be used by firms to induce concentrated
market structures.
Example 7 There are four identical blocks for sale, and let N = 5. In
order to operate a bidder needs at least one block (small license), and bidders
may buy up to two blocks (large license). Each bidder i submits a schedule
bi = (bi(1), bi(2)) where bi(m) is the bid for m blocks, m = 1, 2. Blocks are
allocated and payments are made according to a uniform price auction. For
any partition P of the four blocks in which firm i receives m blocks, and a total
of n firms get at least one block, define viP = π(m,n). If π(2, 2) − π(1, 3) >
π(1, 3), the auction outcome is a duopoly because the extra profit gained by
switching from a small license in a triopoly to a large license in a duopoly
is larger than the profit with a small license in triopoly. That is, two firms
buy two blocks each, the equilibrium price for a block is π(1, 3), and a winner
pays 2π(1, 3). In contrast, a less flexible format could, for example, mandate
that three licenses (two small, one big) are sold. The assessment of the two
formats depends, basically, on the partial derivatives of π. If the derivative
with respect to capacity is larger (presumably it is positive), the flexible format
is likely to be preferable. If, however, the derivative with respect to the size
of the market (presumably negative) is larger, then the less flexible format
is likely to be preferable because of the increased consumer surplus in a less
concentrated market.
In a related vein to the above, it is sometimes argued that welfare maxi-
16This is inspired by the German UMTS license auction that took place in 2001. The
treatment follows Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003).
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mization for bidders and revenue go hand in hand in auctions17. But, again
this view ignores that ”value”, and hence ”revenue” may be driven by the
desire to squeeze consumers’ surplus. Since the value of a monopoly posi-
tion is larger than the combined values of oligopolists, it is intuitive that
an auction for monopoly (which is a form of bundling -Section 4 below) will
yield more revenue than an auction that creates several winners that compete
against each other (at an extreme such an auction yields no revenue at all if
firms expect a ”Bertrand” type of interaction). But welfare, including con-
sumer surplus, will be small under monopoly. This simple argument shows
that revenue and efficiency may be quite unrelated to each other if there are
allocative externalities (see also Janssen and Moldovanu, 2004).
3.7 Private information
So far, we have completely ignored informational issues. In the next Sections,
we will develop several general insights about incentive constraints in models
with informational asymmetries and with externalities (allocative or informa-
tional). Here, we want only to briefly review a number of insights for simple
auction formats with allocative externalities and informational asymmetries.
Note that private information on allocative externality terms can yield
private value models without informational externalities if i knows the ex-
ternality terms vij caused to her, or it can yield interdependent value models
if i has private information on the externality terms vji she causes to others
(of course, mixtures are also possible).
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) analyze a sealed-bid second-price auctions
with entry fees and reserve prices in a model where bidders have one di-
mensional private information that influences both their valuations, and the
externality terms. Specifically, in a two bidder model, θi = vii is private in-
formation, and vij is a function of both θ
i and θj, i.e. vij(θ
i, θj). This model
captures, for example, situations where each firm has private information
about the reduction on marginal cost induced by an innovation, and where
the cost structure is public information after the auction, and before the
market interaction.
This model displays both private and interdependent value components:
when i compares the alternative where he wins to the one where the seller
keeps the object, his net value is θi. When i compares the alternative where
he wins with the one where the other bidder wins, his net value is θi −
17There are many caveats to this claim even without allocative externalities. For exam-
ple, revenue maximization requires the use of reserve prices, or handicaps in asymmetric
contexts (Myerson 1981) , or quantity discounts in multi-object auctions (see Palfrey 1983,
Jehiel-Moldovanu 2001 , and Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn and Moldovanu , 2005).
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vij(θ
i, θj), which depends both on i and j’s private information. Only the
second comparison is relevant if there is no reserve price, and then the analysis
is analogous to the one in Milgrom and Weber’ (1982) framework: in a
symmetric two-bidder setting, i.e., vij(x, y) ≡ v
j
i (x, y) = e(x, y), where the
function x→ x− e(x, x) is increasing, bidder i with type θi bids18
b(θi) = θi − e(θi, θi) (2)
The auction with a reserve price R is more interesting. A first obser-
vation is that, when externalities are negative, there will be no bids in the
neighborhood of R.19 For the sake of illustration, assume that the externality
function is given by a constant −e , where e ≥ 0, and consider R inside the
support of valuations20. The equilibrium is such that bidders with valuation
below R bid below R, (say zero), and bidders with valuations above R bid
θi + e. Thus, there is no relevant bid between R and R + e. The reason
for this discontinuity is as follows: when the marginal type vii = R considers
whether to make a relevant bid or not, the benchmark is that the seller keeps
the object. As soon as a bidder makes a relevant bid, the effect of marginally
decreasing the bid (say) is now that the other bidder sometimes wins. Thus,
in the relevant bid area, the bid function does satisfy (2).
Another interesting observation is that the seller’s optimal reserve price
may be below the seller’s valuation, a situation that never occurs without
externalities21. The reason is that, selling more often frightens bidders when
there are negative externalities, and therefore they bid higher in order to win.
In the case of positive externalities, the equilibrium bidding function still
has two distinct parts, one where the benchmark is that the seller keeps the
object, and another where the benchmark is that the competitor wins. But
now consistently combining the two parts requires that a positive measure
of valuations θi bids R 22. Moreover, with positive externalities, entry fees
and reserve prices do not lead to equivalent revenues, and one can typically
achieve higher revenues with reserve prices than with entry fees.
Moldovanu and Sela (2003) study a patent auction where the post-auction
interaction is a` la Bertrand. There, the analog of the function θi − vij(θi, θj)
is decreasing and pooling occurs even with negative externalities. Goeree
18With more than two bidders and with asymmetries, the features mentioned in the
above subsections (multiplicity of equilibria, strategic non-participation, etc...) appear
also here.
19A similar feature arises in the affiliated model of Milgrom and Weber (1982).
20We also assume that the valuations are identically and independently distributed.
21The optimal reserve price also depends on the number of bidders.
22Pooling also appears in the resale auctions studied by Haile (2000). The reason is that
the possibility of resale translates into a reduced form positive externality.
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(2000), Das Varma (2003) and Molnar and Virag (2004) study a variant
of the above model where the cost structure is not made public after the
auction. In this case, the winning bid has the extra feature of conveying
some information about the cost structure of the winning bidder, and there
is an extra signaling motive appearing in the bidding strategy.
We now briefly consider revenue-maximizing auctions. There are two dif-
ficulties linked to the presence of allocative externalities: 1) Information is
typically multidimensional; 2) Participation constraints are typically deter-
mined by the mechanism itself and are type-dependent.
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) consider a symmetric, private
values setup with multidimensional private information and negative exter-
nalities: bidder i knows her valuation vii and the externalities v
i
j caused to
her. For example, the unique symmetric equilibrium of a second-price auction
among N bidders is given by:
b(vii, v
i
−i) = v
i
i −
1
N − 1
X
vij
Thus, the equilibrium bids are set at the valuation minus the average exter-
nality.
As in the complete information case (see subsection 3.3), the optimal
auction will include some threat in case a bidder does not participate. But,
in this private value model, there is no way to fine-tune the threat for i by
using information revealed by others. It turns out that it is enough to care
about the participation constraint of the type whose valuation is smallest
and whose externalities are closest to zero. The threat (taking the form of a
fixed allocation rule in case i does not participate) can be designed so that
the participation constraints of all other types of bidder i are automatically
satisfied as soon as i’s incentive constraints are satisfied. Thus, even though
participation constraints are a priori type-dependent, the fact that they are
endogenously determined by the mechanism (through the choice of threats)
allows us to avoid some of the complications inherent to exogenous type-
dependent participation constraints23.
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) show that a second-price auction
with an appropriately defined entry fee is the revenue-maximizing mechanism
in a class of mechanisms where the object is always sold, and where agents are
allowed to make one-dimensional bids. They also characterize the equilibrium
of the second price auction with reserve prices, and show that it is never
optimal to set a small reserve price. Thus, either there should be no reserve
23See Jullien (2000) for an analysis of such constraints in one-dimensional principal-agent
setting.
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price or the reserve price should be such that the object is not sold with a
significant probability. This result cannot arise in a one-dimensional setting.
It should also be contrasted with the finding in multidimensional monopoly
problems (where there is no competition among consumers). There, it is
always optimal to exclude some set of consumers no matter where the support
of consumers’ valuations lies (see Armstrong, 1996). By contrast, in the
auction setup, it may be revenue-enhancing for the seller to always sell the
good24
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) construct the revenue maximiz-
ing auction in a setting where bidder i knows her valuation vii and the negative
externality vji ≤ 0 she exerts on other bidders j. This is now a model with
interdependent values or informational externalities. In line with the idea
of targeted threats outlined above, if i does not participate, the auctioneer
optimally decides to sell the good to the agent j(i) = argminj evij where evij is
agent j’s report in a direct mechanism.
Figueroa and Skreta (2004) generalize the analysis of optimal mechanisms
to multi-object settings with externalities, but assume that agents have one-
dimensional signals25.
Das Varma (2002) builds on the model of Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stac-
chetti (1999) and he observes that the ascending English auction may some-
times generate more revenue than sealed-bid auctions. This happens because
bidders have incentives to stay longer in the auction in cases where their
worst enemy also stays in the auction. The insight is particularly interesting
in light of the revenue equivalence theorem in auctions (see subsection 6.1
below). It illustrates that, even in a symmetric, independent, private values
context with risk neutral bidders, the ascending and the sealed-bid auctions
need not be revenue-equivalent if there are allocative externalities.
Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) examine the possibility of collusion in the
presence of negative externalities among agents when private information
bears on the sole valuation. They show that the information sharing among
the ring members need not be efficient even if side-payments are allowed,
which is in sharp contrast with the finding in externality-free auction setups
(see Graham andMarshall (1986), McAfee and McMillan (1992), and Mailath
and Zemsky (1991).
24Having one bidder participate more often increases the others’ incentive to bid more
aggressively, which in turn may dominate the supply restriction effect.
25See also Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) and Brocas (2003).
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3.8 Applications
Auction models with allocative externalities offer an unified framework for
all situations where competing firms or agents buy important inputs that
affect the nature of downstream interaction.
Some effects of externalities on bidding behavior have been previously
identified in the literature on the ”persistence of monopoly” (see, for exam-
ple, the classical paper by Gilbert and Newbery, 1982 , and also Krishna,
1993 and Rodriguez, 2002) and in the literature on patent licensing (see the
classical contributions of Katz and Shapiro (1986), and Kamien and Tau-
man, 1986)26. Similar effects appear in the auctions of capacity studied
by McAfee (1998) and Ranger (2004). Roughly speaking, the general frame-
work presented here extends ”the persistence of monopoly” approach beyond
monopoly/duopoly market structures, and it extends the literature on patent
licensing by allowing for asymmetries between agents27, and by considering
allocation mechanisms that go beyond standard auctions.
Norbaeck and Persson (2003), Molnar (2003) and Inderst and Wey (2004)
analyze large, auction-like deals (such as privatizations, mergers and takeovers)
that change the nature of an industry by affecting the number and the iden-
tity of the operating firms. For example, it is an immediate consequence of
the theory of auctions with negative externalities that a takeover premium
must be observed in horizontal mergers where each firm is negatively affected
if the target is acquired by another competitor. Molnar derives several related
testable hypothesis and looks at the empirical data.
Dana and Spier (1994), Auriol and Laffont (1992), McGuire and Riordan
(1995) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2004) study the efficient design of private
industries in frameworks where the designer (the state) has preferences that
combine measures of consumer surplus and revenue.
Alboth, Lerner and Shalev (2001), Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002),
and Waehrer (2003, 2004) study the properties of bidding games and other
mechanisms for allocating public goods or bads, such as contributions to joint
ventures, or siting of hazardous facilities.
Sorana (2000), and Anton, Van der Weide and Wettas (2002) focus on
bidding and pricing behavior in markets where universal service regulation
applies. The externalities occur across sectors of the market: large urban
areas are often profitable, rural areas are not.
Maeda (2003) and Burguet et Sempere (2005) analyze trading models
for the emission of noxious gases. Using some insights developed for re-
sale markets with externalities (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1999), Burguet et
26See also the more recent papers of Moldovanu and Sela (2002), and Sarbar (2005).
27Rockett (1990) considers asymmetries, but does not offer a general analysis.
19
Sempere emphasize both the inadequacy of bilateral trading mechanisms for
internalizing all existing externalities, and the need for multilateral schemes.
A related point is made by Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2004) who pro-
pose an innovative auction of retaliation rights for dispute settlements within
the World Trade Organization.
We have emphasized above the effects of allocative externalities on bid-
ding behavior/mechanism design. A small recent literature studies the effect
of financial externalities, i.e., agents directly care about the monetary pay-
ments made by others. Dasgupta and Tsui (2004) and Ettinger (2000) study
bidding behavior in auctions where buyers and sellers are intertwined through
cross-shareholding. Their finding about the revenue comparison of first-price
and second-price sealed-bid auctions with vertical toeholds has antecedents
in Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) and Bulow et al. (1999). Morgan, Steiglitz,
and Reiss (2003) describe the effects of ”spite” in auctions. Their agents
enjoy when other pay much (this can be driven by pure spite, but also by
some post-auction interaction where it is better to have financial weaker com-
petitors). In a related framework, Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner
(2004) look at charity auctions, and emphasize the effects of the endogenous
financial externalities.
4 Private Values
In this Section we study private values models: there are no informational
externalities. Note, however, that allocative externalities are allowed. The
focus is on the possibility of implementing the welfare-maximizing social
choice rule via Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and on the form of more
general social choice rules that can be implemented in dominant strategy
(Roberts, 1979).
4.1 Welfare-Maximization
We briefly review the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves analysis, and several
extensions relevant for our purposes. We assume that viP (θ) ≡ viP (θi). Thus,
agent i cares only about his own private signal, but may care about the entire
partition of objects.
In private values settings, the VCG analysis allows for multidimensional
signals, allocative externalities and complementarities without any further
theoretical difficulties.
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For any profile of signals θ , define
P ∗(θ) = argmax
P∈P
X
j
vjP (θ
j) (3)
Partition P ∗(θ) maximizes the economic value for the agents28. Let P−i
be a partition of objects where agent i is allocated the empty set, and let
P−i denote the set of such partitions. For any profile θ−i define
P ∗−i(θ
−i) = arg max
P−i∈P−i
X
j 6=i
vjP−i(θ
j) (4)
Partition P ∗−i(θ
−i) represents the welfare-maximizing partition of objects
in the absence of i.
Definition 8 (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves ) The VCG mechanism is the di-
rect revelation mechanism where, for each reported profile of signals θ, the
designer implements partition P ∗(θ) = argmaxP∈P
P
j v
j
P (θ
j), and makes a
transfer to i given by
ti(θ−i) =
X
j 6=i
vjP∗(θ)(θ
j)−
X
j 6=i
vj
P∗−i(θ
−i)
(θj) (5)
It is well-known that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for each player
in the VCG mechanism. Moreover, if all agents reveal their information
truthfully, the welfare maximizing partition of objects is obviously chosen
(see Vickrey, 1961, Clarke, 1971, and Groves, 1973). It is important to notice
that, except in degenerate cases, agents in a VCG mechanism have strictly
positive interim incentives to report truthfully because of the uncertainty
(still to be resolved at the time of the reporting) about the chosen alternative.
All these aspects certainly justify Paul Milgrom’s claim (see Milgrom, 2004)
that ” The VCG analysis has become an important standard. It is the work
by which nearly all other mechanism design work is judged and in terms of
which its contribution is assessed.”
4.2 Dominant-Strategy Implementation withoutWelfare-
Maximization
In some applications, one may be interested in goals other than welfare. An
appealing property of the VCG mechanism is that the truthful equilibrium
28If the argmax is not unique, any selection will do.
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is in dominant strategies. This subsection reports a characterization, due
to Roberts (1979), of those social choice rules that can be implemented in
dominant strategy. Such a characterization can be used, for example, in an
analysis of how revenue can be maximized in dominant strategy mechanisms.
Roberts’ model assumes private values, and requires that each agent i gets
a one-dimensional signal for each social alternative29. Applied to auctions,
this means θi = (θiP )P∈P , where θ
i
P ∈ < , and viP (θ) ≡ viP (θiP ).
Crucial assumptions for Roberts’ characterization are:
1. There are at least 3 relevant partitions.
2. For any x ∈ <|P| there exists θi = (θiP )P∈P ∈ Θi such that {viP (θiP )}P∈P =
x.
With these assumptions, Roberts shows that a deterministic social choice
function Ψ is dominant strategy implementable only if there is a set of real
weights {αi}i=1,2,..N , not all equal to zero, and a set of real weights {λP}P∈P
such that
P λ(θ) = argmax
P∈P
[
X
j
αjvjP (θ
j
P ) + λP ]
Thus, dominant strategy implementable social choice functions must max-
imize a weighted average of the agents values, augmented by a partition-
specific weight. Jehiel et al. (2004) call these functions affine maximizers.
The dominant-strategy implementability30 of affine maximizers is an easy
consequence of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves analysis (just think about the λP ’s
as the designer’s preferences on partitions). The key contribution of Roberts
(1979) is that under conditions 1 and 2 above, nothing but affine maximizers
can be implemented in dominant strategy.
Besides the unbounded range assumption, the crucial condition 2 above
implies that agents must care about the entire partition of goods. Thus,
there must be allocative externalities for Roberts’ characterization to hold !
Bickchandani et al. (2004), Gui et al. (2004) and Lavi et al. (2004) char-
acterize dominant-strategy implementability on various restricted domains
where condition 2 need not hold31. Their results are in terms of monotonic-
ity conditions that need to be satisfied by an implementable social choice
function.
29This last assumption can be relaxed. See Jehiel et. al. (2004).
30Not every affine maximizer is implementable! Problems arise if some weight αi is
zero. But, the definition of an affine maximizer can be slightly adapted so that all affine
maximizers are implementable.
31The characterization for situations with only two social alternatives is due to Laffont
and Maskin (1982).
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For example, Bickchandani et al. (2004) study a model where there are
L identical units for sale, and where signals are drawn from a compact hy-
percube: here θi = (θi1, .., θ
i
L) and v
i
P (θ
i) = viPi(θ
i) =
P|Pi|
l=1 θ
i
l . Thus, θ
i
l
represents i0s marginal utility from the l -th unit, and there are no allocative
externalities. A social choice function is implementable in dominant strategy
if it is non-decreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). That is, if i is allocated
more units when he reports eθi than when he reports θi, then it must be the
case that his valuation at eθi for the additional units is at least as large as his
valuation at θi.32 Affine maximizers satisfy the monotonicity condition, but,
on the present restricted domain, there are other social choice functions that
satisfy NDMU, and thus are dominant-strategy implementable.
Gui et al. (2004) offer characterizations on several other restricted do-
mains (e.g., auctions of heterogeneous objects without allocative externalities
- these are also studied by Lavi et al., 2004) via a generalization of NDMU
that is formulated in terms of preference cycles on the type space. Generally
speaking, Roberts’s result does not hold on restricted domains unless one
imposes additional conditions on the social choice functions33.
Holzman and Monderer (2004), and Holzman et al. (2004) focus on ex-
post equilibria of the VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions without
allocative and informational externalities. Holzman et.al. (2004) study spe-
cific strategies of the following type: a certain family of bundles is specified in
advance, and is common to all bidders. These only report valuations for this
family34. If there are at least three players, such strategies form a symmetric
ex-post equilibrium if and only if the designated family is a quasi-field (i.e.,
it is closed under complements and disjoint unions). Holzman and Monderer
(2004) show that all ex-post equilibria in the VCG mechanism must revolve
around a quasi-field of bundles, as explained above. Again, due to the re-
stricted domain of preferences, the implemented social choice functions need
not be affine maximizers.
32Formally, let Ψi(θ) be the number of units allocated to agent i. Ψ is non-decreasing
in marginal utilities if if for every i, θ−i, θi,eθi:
If Ψi(eθi, θ−i) > Ψi(θi, θ−i) then Ψi(eθ
i
,θ−i)X
l=Ψi(θi,θ−i)+1
eθil ≥ Ψi(eθ
i
,θ−i)X
l=Ψi(θi,θ−i)+1
θil
33For example, Lavi et. al. (2004) introduce an independence of irrelevant alternative
assumption, while Meyer-ter-Vehn and Moldovanu (2003) introduce player decisiveness.
34Valuations for other bundles are mechanically calculated based on the declarations for
bundles in the designated family.
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4.3 Applications: Revenue Maximization and Mixed
Bundling
Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) have described the revenue-
maximizing auction for the one-object case without allocative or informa-
tional externalities. If bidders are ex-ante symmetric, the optimal auction is
a second-price auction with a reserve price, and hence it is implementable in
dominant strategies. In that mechanism, the object is allocated efficiently
whenever it is allocated at all to one of the buyers. Note that a reserve price
is nothing else than a weight on the alternative where the seller keeps the
object. Thus, for ex-ante symmetric bidders, the one-object revenue maxi-
mizing auction is a very simple affine maximizer, as defined above.
The analog revenue-maximizing multi-object auction is not yet known,
and we doubt that the problem is analytically tractable (the problem is how
to deal with complex integrability constraint due to multidimensional signals
in the Bayes-Nash framework - see next Section for details).
Given the above difficulty, the main idea in Jehiel et al. (2005) is to study
the revenue properties of the restricted class of affine maximizers. This class
well captures the idea of bundling and mixed-bundling that are known to be
revenue-enhancing in monopolistic non-linear pricing models.
Jehiel et al. (2005) consider the simplest model with heterogeneous ob-
jects: there are no allocative or informational externalities, nor complemen-
tarities and substitutabilities35: Each buyer i obtains a private signal θim ∈ <
about each object m, and viP (θ) = v
i
Pi
(θi) = viPi(θ
i
Pi
) =
P
m∈Pi θ
i
m. For the
seller, we assume here v0P ≡ 0. Pbun ⊂ P is the subset of pure bundling
allocations, i.e. P ∈ Pbun ⇒ ∃i such that Pj = ∅ for all j 6= i.
Two simple auction rules with equilibria in dominant strategies immedi-
ately come to mind: separate Vickrey auctions (one for each object), and a
Vickrey auction for the entire bundle of all the objects. In the separate auc-
tions, every object goes to the bidder who values it most, and each winning
bidder pays the highest rejected bid on each object she receives. In the pure
bundling auction, the set of all objects goes to the bidder who values highest
the entire lot and the winner pays the highest rejected bid on the entire lot.
Jehiel et al. (2005) define a large class of auctions, called λ-auctions, that
encompass many well-known formats, including the two described above36:
35The extension that allows for complementarities or substitutabilities between objects is
straightforward, but we focus on additive valuations in order to single out the competitive
effect of bundling rather than the ”technological” one.
36Note that, however large, the class of choice rules implemented by λ-auctions is a
strict subclass of dominant-strategy implementable choice rules since Roberts’ domain
restrictions do not hold here.
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To each partition P ∈ P we attach a real-valued parameter λP ∈ R that
enhances the probability that the allocation P will be chosen by the auction,
and we then add transfers (defined in the spirit of the VCG mechanism)
ensuring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy:
Definition 9 The (λP )P∈P-auction (which we shall also call λ-auction) is
defined by the allocation rule
P λ (θ) = argmax
P∈P
(Ã
NX
j=1
vjP (θ
j)
!
+ λP
)
(6)
and by the transfer rule
ti (θ) = −
ÃÃX
j 6=i
vj
Pλ(θ)
(θj)
!
+ λPλ(θ)
!
+ τ i
¡
θ−i
¢
(7)
where τ i
¡
θ−i
¢
= maxP∈P
³P
j 6=i v
j
Pj
(θj) + viPi + λP
´
and viPi is i’s minimum
valuation for Pi.
37
Just to give an example, separate second-price auctions for theM objects
with reserve price rm for object m are replicated by the λ-auction where ,
for each partition P, λP =
P
m∈P0 rm , i.e. the weight on an allocation is the
sum of the reservation prices over all the objects that are not sold.
Observe that revenue maximization in the above defined class reduces to
a problem of maximization over a finite collection of real numbers {λP}P∈P
- this problem can be solved by numerical simulation with a small computer.
Given truthfully reported valuations in an λ-auction, denote by R (λ) and
S (λ) the expected revenue and expected social surplus, respectively. Jehiel
et al. (2005) show that the effect of changing λ on expected revenue can be
decomposed in an effect on social surplus and an effect on bidder surplus:
∂R
∂λP
(λ) =
∂S
∂λP
(λ) +
NX
i=1
[Pr
¡
P λ (θ) 6= P¢− Pr ¡P λ−i(θ−i) 6= P¢]
By definition, the social surplus S (λ) is maximized at the efficient auction
where λ ≡ 0, and therefore ∇S (0) = 0. Thus, a necessary condition for the
efficient auction to maximize revenue in the class of (λP )P∈P-auctions is :
∀P ∈ P,
NX
i=1
[−Pr
¡
P λ (θ) = P
¢
+Pr
¡
P λ−i(θ
−i) = P
¢
] = 0 (8)
37τ i is set so that the type with minimum valuations receive a zero payoff.
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This is a non-generic condition on the density function governing the
distribution of signals. In other words, by introducing a small λP for some P
one can almost always improve upon the efficient auction. Since λ 6= 0 creates
an inefficiency, this shows, in particular, that the revenue-maximizing auction
need not allocate the objects to those buyers who value them most, in marked
contrast to the one-object case38, and to various claims in the literature (see
for example, Armstrong 2000).
In Jehiel et al. (2005), we also show that pure bundling auctions39 can
always be improved upon in terms of revenues. Thus, the best λ-auction
necessarily involve some form of mixed bundling in which sometimes the
goods are sold in bundles, and sometimes they are not.
5 Informational Externalities
In this Section we focus on the role of informational externalities, i.e., the
information θj held by agent j affects agent i’s utility in some alternative
k. The theoretical interest in settings with informational externalities is not
new. The classical contributions of Wilson (1969) and Milgrom and Weber
(1981) , and the large literature following them analyzed one-object auctions
with symmetric bidders. In contrast, the focus of the more recent literature
is on multi-object auctions, and on the effects of asymmetries (see Maskin,
1992) on welfare-maximization.
The analysis will be divided in three parts. In Subsection 5.1 we first
report some general insights about incentive compatibility and payoff equiv-
alence in contexts with multidimensional signals. In Subsection 5.2 we next
inquire whether the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves idea for private values can be ex-
tended to settings with informational externalities. The main result is that,
generically, if at least one agent holds a signal with at least two dimensions,
no Bayes-Nash mechanism exists that implements the welfare maximizing
allocation if signals are independently distributed across agents. A fortiori,
for any distribution of signals (not necessarily independent across agents),
no mechanism exists that implements the welfare-maximizing allocation in
38See also Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001b) who connect Pafrey’s results to the payoff
equivalence theorem.
39Pure bundling auctions has been first studied by Palfrey (1983), who showed that the
pure bundling auction is revenue superior to separate, efficient auctions if there are only
two bidders. Under some technical assumptions on the distribution of types, Chakraborty
(1999) showed that there is a critical number of bidders, below which pure bundling
outperforms separate auctions, and above which separate auctions outperform the pure
bundling auction.
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ex-post equilibrium40, if at least one agent holds a signal with at least two di-
mensions. If the signals of all agents are one-dimensional, welfare-maximizing
implementation is possible under a single-crossing condition. This and other
possibility scenarios are discussed in subsection 5.3.
In Subsection 5.4, we inquire what social choice functions (not necessarily
welfare-maximizing) can be implemented in a robust way, independently of
the distributions of signals (i.e., in an ex-post equilibrium). The main result
is that, generically, if at least two agents hold a signal with at least two
dimensions, no choice rule that conditions on the signals can be robustly
implemented.
Thus, the two main insights obtained for private value settings with al-
locative externalities in Section 4 cannot be extended to frameworks with
informational externalities, unless valuations are not generic or signals are
one-dimensional.
5.1 Incentive Compatibility and Payoff Equivalence
Recall the social choice framework described in Section 2. Agents have quasi-
linear utility functions that depend on the chosen alternative k, on private
signals θ = (θ0, θ1, ...θN), and on a monetary payment ti :
ui(k, θ, ti) = vik(θ) + t
i
The revelation principle asserts that, for any Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of any given mechanism, one can construct an equivalent equilibrium of a
direct revelation mechanism where all agents truthfully report their private
information. Thus, for the characterization results, we focus below on truth-
telling equilibria in direct revelation mechanisms.
Denote by vi(θ) the vector (vik(θ))k∈K , and Let ∆
|K|−1 denote the simplex
of probability distributions over the finite set of alternatives. A direct reve-
lation mechanism is given by a pair (Ψ, t) where Ψ : Θ = ×Ni=0Θi → ∆|K|−1
is the allocation rule, and t : Θ → <N+1 is the payment rule. Given a
mechanism (Ψ, t), define
vi(τ i, θi) = Eθ−i [Ψ(τ
i, θ−i) · vi(θ)] (9)
and
t
i
(τ i) = Eθ−i [t
i(τ i, θ−i)] (10)
40In frameworks with interdependent values, this concept forms the natural generaliza-
tion of dominant strategy equilibrium.
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Then
U i(τ i, θi) = vi(τ i, θi) + ti(τ i) (11)
represents agent i0s expected utility when all other agents report truth-
fully, and when i has true type θi but reports type τ i.
A mechanism (Ψ, t) is incentive compatible if:
∀i, θi, V i(θi) ≡ U i(θi, θi) = sup
τ i∈Θi
U i(τ i, θi) (12)
In other words, V i(θi) represents agent i’s expected utility in a truthful
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
There are several versions of characterization results in the literature.
The one below is due to Krishna and Maenner (2001):
Theorem 10 Assume that, for each i, the type set Θi is convex and that
ui(k, θ
−i, ·, ti) is a convex function of θi. Then, in any incentive compatible
mechanism (Ψ, t), the expected equilibrium utility function V i(θi) is convex,
and is determined by the allocation rule Ψ up to an additive constant. For
any θi, τ i ∈ Θi, and for any smooth path γ joining θi to τ i in Θi, it holds that
V i(θi) = V i(τ i) +
Z
qi · dγ (13)
where qi is a subgradient41 of V i at θi.
The main complication added by the presence of multidimensional signals
is the requirement that qi , which is fully determined by Ψ, be a (sub)gradient
of a convex function V i. Whereas this requirement reduces to a standard
monotonicity condition in the one-dimensional case, it involves both a mono-
tonicity condition, and a differential condition on the cross derivatives of qi
(yielding the path independence condition) if signals are multidimensional -
see Subsection 5.2 for further illustration). These consequences of multidi-
mensional constraints in the context of auctions have been first pointed out
by Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996, 1999).42
To get some geometric intuition about the added complexity, consider the
following example:
41Consider a convex function F : C → < where C ⊂ <d. A vector x∗ ∈ <d is a
subgradient of F at x ∈ C if for all y ∈ C it holds: F (y) ≥ x∗ · (y − x). Whenever F is
differentiable (a.e.) the subgradient is unique and coincides with the usual gradient. Note
that convex functions are twice continuously differentiable almost everywhere.
42Analogous results appeared earlier in the monopolistic screening literature (see Rochet,
1985).
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Figure 2:
Example 11 There are two objects, A and B , and one bidder. The bidder
obtains a two-dimensional private signal (vA, vB) about the values of the two
goods. The bundle is worth vA+ vB. Any deterministic, incentive compatible
mechanism divides the two-dimensional set of types into areas of constant
allocation. The gradient of the equilibrium utility is given here by the prob-
abilities with which the bidder gets the objects. Thus, the vector q is either
(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) or (1, 1). Convexity of V (or, equivalently, monotonicity of
q) implies that, as we increase valuations, q is only allowed to ”jump” from
(0, 0) to either (0, 1), (1, 0) or (1, 1), and from (0, 1), (1, 0) to (1, 1). This is
similar to the insight obtained in one-dimensional models. But, there is an
additional twist here: if a jump occurs, the integral of q will not depend on
the path of integration (i.e., the vector field q is conservative) if and only if
”the jump vector” is perpendicular to the boundary between the areas where
each alternative is chosen. For example, the boundary between areas where
the buyer gets both objects or none must have a slope of 45◦ (since the jump
is (1, 1)− (0, 0) = (1, 1)), while the boundaries between areas where the buyer
gets one object or two are either horizontal, or vertical lines. While in the
present example with one bidder these observations are simple (and could be
derived from the well-known Taxation Principle of monopolistic screening),
the analog conditions become very involved when there are several interacting
agents, as is generally the case in auctions. The requirement of conservative-
ness of the vector field q yields partial differential equations that determine
the boundaries, and these need not be straight lines (for these insights and
an application, see Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti, 1999).
An important corollary of Theorem 10 is the so called payoff and revenue
equivalence result. Consider two incentive compatible mechanisms (Ψ, t)
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and (Ψ, s) that implement the same allocation rule Ψ, and thus yield the
same expressions for vi and qi. Choose an arbitrary type eθi, and let V it (eθi)
and Vs(eθi) denote the expected equilibrium utility in the truth-telling
equilibria of (Ψ, t) and (Ψ, s), respectively. Payoff and revenue equivalence
follows immediately from the above Theorem by noting that :
∀i, θi, ti(θi) = V it (eθi)− vi(θi, θi) + Z qi · dγ
∀i, θi, si(θi) = V is (eθi)− vi(θi, θi) + Z qi · dγ
The above equations yield together:
∀i, θi, ti(θi)− si(θi) = V it (eθi)− V is (eθi) = const
In other words, expected transfers in the two mechanisms are, up to a
constant, the same.
Analogous payoff equivalence results for dominant-strategy or ex-post
implementation can be proved along similar lines, but these no longer require
that the distribution of signals be independent across agents. Moreover, they
deliver equivalence up to a constant of actual transfers rather than expected
transfers (see, for example, Chung and Ely, 2001).
5.2 The Impossibility of Welfare Maximization
To illustrate this impossibility result, we consider a linear specification of
preferences, and we assume that the designer has no private information θ0.
Let
vik(θ
1, ..., θN) =
NX
j=1
ajkiθ
j
ki,
and assume that aiki ≥ 0 for all k, i. The signal θi of agent i is drawn
from a space Θi ⊆ 211dK×N according to a continuous density fi(θi) > 0 ,
independently of other agents ’ signals θ−i.
Consider a direct revelation mechanism (DRM) (Ψ, t) whereΨk(τ 1, ...τN)
is the probability that alternative k is chosen given the report profile τ =
(τ 1, ...τN), and ti(τ 1, ...τN) is the transfer received by agent i given the report
profile τ .
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We now use the methodology developed for Theorem 10 in subsection 5.1.
Recall that the function
V i(θi) = U i(θi, θi) = sup
τ i
U i(τ i, θi) (14)
represents i0s expected utility in a truth-telling equilibrium of a direct reve-
lation mechanism.
The function V i is convex, and hence twice differentiable almost every-
where. Assuming that V i is differentiable at θi, we obtain by the Envelope
Theorem that:
∂V i
∂θiki
(θi) = aikiq
i
k(θ
i)
∂V i
∂θikj
(θi) = 0 for j 6= i
where
qik(τ
i) =
Z
Θ−i
Ψk(τ i, θ
−i)f−i(θ
−i)dθ−i
is i0s equilibrium interim expected probability that alternative k is chosen
conditional on i’s report τ i. Assuming that V i is twice continuously differ-
entiable at θi, we obtain by Schwarz’s Theorem that the cross derivatives of
V i at θi must be equal. This implies for all k, k0, i, j 6= i:
aiki
∂qik(θ
i)
∂θik0i
= aik0i
∂qik0(θ
i)
∂θiki
(15)
aiki
∂qik(θ
i)
∂θik0j
= 0 (16)
Consider now a welfare-maximizing allocation rule where Ψk∗(θ
1, ...θN) = 0
if k∗ /∈ argmaxk
NX
i=1
vik(θ
1, ..., θN). For such rules one can directly compute
the induced interim expected probabilities that each alternative is chosen.
The impossibility result is obtained by showing that these functions cannot
generically satisfy (15) and (16):
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Theorem 12 (Jehiel-Moldovanu 2001a) Let (Ψ, t) be a welfare maximizing
DRM, and assume that the following conditions are satisfied. (1) There exist
i, j, k such that i 6= j, aiki 6= 0 and aikj 6= 0. (2) There exists an open set
of θi such that, depending on the realization of θ−i, the welfare maximizing
alternative is either k or k0. Then (Ψ, t) cannot be incentive compatible.
Proof. Conditions 1 and 2 ensure that, for an open set of signals θi, the
interim expected probabilities (that each alternative is chosen) induced by
any value maximizing DRM must satisfy ∂qik(θ
i)/∂θikj 6= 0. This is incom-
patible with (16).
To prove Theorem 12 we have only used identities (16). This is enough
because the signal θi of agent i has dimension N ×K, which, in particular,
is larger than the dimension of the alternatives K. This result is not too
surprising, as it seems impossible to elicit an information that has more
dimensions than the number of alternatives the agent cares about. Maskin
(1992) provided an early example with this flavor, but he used the stronger
ex-post equilibrium concept.
It is important then to understand what happens to the impossibility
result if the dimension of the signals is no larger than K, the number of
payoff-relevant alternatives, i.e., when the simple insight obtained above does
not necessarily hold. Consider the same setting as above, except that agent
i receives a K-dimensional signal43 θi = (θik) and
vik(θ
1, ..., θN) =
NX
j=1
ajkiθ
j
k.
The analogues of identities (15) are now: for all i and k, k0 6= k,
For all i, k, k0 6= k, aiki
∂qik(θ
i)
∂θik0
= aik0i
∂qik0(θ
i)
∂θik
. (17)
Theorem 13 (Jehiel-Moldovanu 2001a) Let (Ψ, t) be a welfare maximizing
DRM, and assume that the following conditions are satisfied: (1) There exist
i, k and k0 such that aik0i 6= 0. (2) There exists an open set of θi such that,
depending on the realization of θ−i, the welfare maximizing alternative is
either k or k0. Then, if (Ψ, t) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, it must be
the case that:
aiki
aik0i
=
PN
j=1 a
i
kjPN
j=1 a
i
k0j
. (18)
43That is, from the viewpoint of the above more general model, we assume that θjik = θ
j
k.
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Proof. The result follows from the observation that a welfare-maximizing
DRM must satisfy
NX
j=1
aikj
∂qik(θ
i)
∂θik0
=
NX
j=1
aik0j
∂qik0(θ
i)
∂θik
. (19)
To see this, consider a setting where all agents’ preferences coincide with
total welfare. If a DRM chooses the welfare maximizing alternative (without
any transfer), every agent has obviously an incentive to report truthfully.
Thus, the analog of conditions (17) must be satisfied for such preferences,
yielding conditions (19). In other words, condition (19) must hold for the
interim expected probabilities generated by any mechanism that chooses the
welfare-maximizing alternative! But, the incentive constraints (with respect
to the original preferences) imply conditions (17). Combining (17) and (19)
we get (18).
Since the above formulation is relatively abstract, it is helpful to consider
a simple auction example:
Example 14 There are two objects A and B, and two bidders i = 1, 2.
Each bidder i receives a two-dimensional signal θi = (θiA, θ
i
B). There are no
allocative externalities44. Bidder i’s preference (which depends only on i’s
bundle) is assumed to take the following linear form:
viX(θ) = θ
i
X + a
−i
Xiθ
−i
X , X = A,B
viAB(θ) = v
i
A(θ) + v
i
B(θ) + s
i
AB
We refer to siAB as i’s synergy term, and assume here that these terms are
common knowledge.
Consider a direct truthful mechanism with associated interim expected
probabilities qiP (θ
i), where the partition P = Pij, denotes the allocation
where object A is allocated to agent i and object B to agent j (thus Pii
denotes the allocation where i gets both objects, and so on..). Let V i(θi)
denote the corresponding equilibrium utility of bidder i. Assuming that V i
is differentiable at θi, we obtain by the Envelope Theorem that:
∂V i
∂θiA
(θi) = qiPii(θ
i) + qiPij(θ
i)
∂V i
∂θiB
(θi) = qiPii(θ
i) + qiPji(θ
i)
44Note that every bidder receives a signal of lower dimension than the the number of
partitions, or even than the number of bundles he cares about.
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Assuming that V i is twice continuously differentiable at θi, we obtain that:
∂
∂θiB
[qiPii(θ
i) + qiPij(θ
i)] =
∂
∂θiA
[qiPii(θ
i) + qiPji(θ
i)] (20)
Consider now the welfare-maximizing allocation rule, and let eqiP (θi) denote
the expected probability that the partition P is chosen conditional on i’s
signal θi. Observing that such an allocation can be implemented whenever
agents’ preferences coincide with total welfare, we obtain that eq must satisfy:
∂
∂θiB
[eqiPii + eqiPij + aiAjeqiPji + aiAjeqiPjj ](θi) (21)
=
∂
∂θiA
[eqiPii + eqiPji + aiBjeqiPij + aiBjeqiPjj ](θi) (22)
In general, equations (20) and (21) are not compatible unless aiAj = a
i
Bj =
0, i.e., unless there are no informational externalities! To see that, assume for
concreteness that the partition Pjj is never welfare-maximizing (say, because
sjAB is negative with a large absolute value), and assume that a
i
Bj = 0 while
aiAj > 0. Then eqiPjj = 0, and it is readily verified that (20) and (21) are
incompatible because ∂∂θiB
eqiPji 6= 0 whenever45 ∂∂θiB [eqiPii + eqiPij + aiAjeqiPji ] =
∂
∂θiA
[eqiPii + eqiPji ].
In some special (yet non-generic) cases, the welfare-maximizing allocation
rule can be implemented even when there are informational externalities.
This is, for example, the case when siAB = 0, i = 1, 2 and when a
−i
Xi < 1,
X = A,B, i = 1, 2. Then the welfare-maximizing rule can be implemented
using separate, one dimensional second price auctions (see Maskin, 1992 who
studies the one-dimensional one-object case and who emphasizes the role of
a single crossing condition, amounting here to a−iXi < 1).
It is worth understanding why a welfare-maximizing allocation rule si-
multaneously satisfies (20) and (21) when siAB = 0, i = 1, 2. Given the
separability of the problems in this case, the efficient allocation takes the
form:
qiPii(θ
i) = qiA(θ
i
A)q
i
B(θ
i
B)
qiPij(θ
i) = qiA(θ
i
A)[1− qiB(θiB)]
qiPji(θ
i) = [1− qiA(θiA)]qiB(θiB)
qiPjj(θ
i) = [1− qiA(θiA)][1− qiB(θiB)]
45For example, if the synergy term siAB is non-positive, and if partition Pji is sometimes
welfare maximizing, one gets ∂∂θiB
eqiPji > 0.
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where qiX(θ
i
X) denotes the interim expected probability that good X is al-
located to i conditional on θiX (it solely depends on θ
i
X because of the
separability property). It is then an elementary exercise to check that con-
ditions (20) and (??) are always met for such separable allocation functions,
no matter what aiXj are
46.
To sum up, the welfare-maximizing allocation rule cannot be implemented
in auction setups with interdependent values and multidimensional signals
except in cases where the allocation problem can be divided in separate one-
object, one-dimensional auctions47. Such a separation is usually impossible
if there are complementarities/substitutabilities or allocative externalities.
5.3 Possibility Results and Applications
5.3.1 One-dimensional signals
For a two-bidder, one-object auction with interdependent values Maskin
(1992) has shown that welfare maximization can be achieved if both bidders
have a one-dimensional signal, and if a single crossing condition holds. This
observation has been extended to more general, one-dimensional settings by
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Ausubel (1997), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001a),
Perry and Reny (2002), Bergemann and Valimaki (2002) and Krishna (2003).
Within the above described linear model, we provide now a condition en-
suring that welfare maximization can be obtained when each agent i receives
a one dimensional signal θi ∈ <, and i’s value of alternative k is given by:
vik(θ
1, ..., θN) =
NX
j=1
ajkiθ
j.
Theorem 15 (Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001a) Suppose that for all i, k, k0
aiki
aik0i
> 1⇒
NX
j=1
aikj
NX
j=1
aik0j
> 1.
46The requirement that aiXj < 1 is derived from the standard one-dimensional incentive
compatibility condition that an agent with a higher signal should receive the good with a
higher probability.
47Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) contains an early impossibility result in a one-
object auction with allocative externalities, interdependent values and multidimensional
signals.
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Then there exists a welfare-maximizing, Bayesian incentive compatible mech-
anism.
The set of parameters for which welfare maximization can be achieved is
now an open set, and it has positive measure. The fundamental difference
is due to the incentive constraints that now reduce to a simple monotonic-
ity condition (without the complex integrability requirement). The relevant
mechanism for the above result follows the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves logic by
completely dampening the influence of one’s own signal on one’s own transfer.
Several papers work within an one-dimensional setup in order to analyze
conditions under which specific bidding formats can lead to welfare maximiza-
tion, or in order to study the role of additional requirements such as participa-
tion constraints or budget balancedness. Building on Maskin (1992)’s result
, Krishna (2003) derives conditions (stronger than single-crossing) ensuring
the efficiency of the English ascending auction even if there are more bidders.
Kirchkamp and Moldovanu (2004) experimentally compare the performance
of the English and second-price sealed-bid auctions with interdependent val-
uations: as predicted by theory, the English auction is superior from an
efficiency point of view. Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Perry and Reny
(2002) present welfare-maximizing bidding schemes for multi-object auctions
where agents have one-dimensional signals.
Gresik (1991), Fieseler, Kittsteiner and Moldovanu (2003), Kittsteiner
(2003), Jehiel and Pauzner (2004), Ornelas and Tuner (2004) and Brusco,
Lopomo, and Wiswanathan (2004) analyze properties of trading models with
interdependent values and one-dimensional signals in a variety of settings
that combine features of the classical models due to Akerlof (1970), Myerson-
Satterthwaite (19831) and Cramton-Gibbons-Klemperer (1987). For exam-
ple, Kittsteiner et al. (2003) show that negative (positive) informational ex-
ternalities make it easier (harder) to construct welfare-maximizing, budget
balanced and individual-rational mechanisms than in analogous cases with
private values. The sign of the informational externalities plays also a crucial
role for over/under - investment in the information acquisition model with in-
terdependent values studied by Bergemann and Valimaki (2002). Jehiel and
Pauzner (2005) show, in contrast to Cramton et al. (1987)’s private value
result, that extreme ownership structures may dominate mixed ownerships
in partnership dissolution setups with interdependent values and one-sided
private information.
Hain and Mitra (2004) and Kittsteiner and Moldovanu (2005) analyze
scheduling and queueing problems, respectively, where agents have private
information about processing times: this naturally yields a model with in-
formational externalities since waiting costs depend on information available
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to others. Gruener and Kiel (2004) focus on collective decisions with inter-
dependent values in the absence of monetary transfers48.
The impossibility results established above has consequences for the de-
sign of private industries. If the competing firms hold multi-dimensional
private information about their cost structure (say on fixed and marginal
cost), then it is impossible to induce a welfare maximizing market structure
even if there are no costs to public funds. This is illustrated in Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2004), and it contrasts with the analysis performed in Dana and
Spier (1994), Auriol and Laffont (1992), and McGuire and Riordan (1995) in
which private information is one-dimensional and the sole economic friction
comes from the shadow cost of public funds.
5.3.2 Multi-dimensional signals
The correlated case: Our main impossibility results (Theorems 12
and 13) assume that the signals are independently distributed across agents.
If there are several agents and if the signals held by the various agents are
correlated, it is possible to design subtle transfer devices whereby the belief
held by agent i on the signal of agent j is elicited for free by the designer.
When j’s belief about i’s signal completely determines the signal held by i, a
welfare-maximizing allocation can be (approximately) implemented49, using
the logarithmic scoring rule used in Johnson et al. (1990) and Johnson et
al. (2003). It is important to note that the approach developed by Cremer-
McLean (1985, 1988) is not useful50 here since it relies on the existence of a
welfare-maximizing mechanism, but as shown above, this assumption is not
fulfilled if there are informational externalities and multidimensional signals.
To illustrate Johnson et al. ’s idea, suppose that agent j has the belief
that i’s signal is distributed according to the density β(θi), and that agent
j is asked to report her belief to a designer who observes the realization of
θi (in equilibrium this will be reported by i). Suppose further that (up to a
constant) agent j receives ln eβ(θi) conditional on θi , where eβ(·) is the report
made by j about her belief on i’s signal.51 It is readily verified that agent j
48They give the example of decision making within the European Central Bank.
49In two important papers, Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2005) challenge
the view that, generically, there is a one-to one mapping from j’s belief onto i’s type in
the correlated case.
50McLean and Postelwaite (2004) use this approach, but only for situations where agents
are informationally small.
51We assume (for now) that the report made by j is not used to implement a social
alternative.
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will choose optimally to report her true belief. This is becauseZ
β(θi) ln eβ(θi)dθi ≤ Z β(θi) lnβ(θi)dθi ⇔Z
β(θi) ln
eβ(θi)
β(θi)
dθi ≤ 1
and because Z
β(θi) ln
eβ(θi)
β(θi)
dθi ≤ ln(
Z
β(θi)
eβ(θi)
β(θi)
dθi) = 0
by the concavity of the logarithm, and by the property that
R eβ(θi)dθi = 1
which is met by any probability measure eβ.
It is not hard to see how the welfare-maximizing allocation can be (ap-
proximately) implemented whenever there is a one-to-one mapping from j’s
belief onto i’s signal: by having a transfer that puts a sufficiently large weight
on ln eβ(θi), agent j will have the right incentive to report her true belief on
i’s signal (the belief being isomorphic to her type). This result does not rely
at all on the form of the preferences, and it is solely driven by the facts that
different types correspond to different beliefs, and that beliefs can be elicited
for free when there is no restriction on the size of the transfers.
Arbitrarily large transfers (via the weight on ln eβ(θi)) are required when-
ever distributions of types are nearly independent across agents. If bounds
on transfers are imposed (because, say, of limited liability constraints) our
impossibility result persists whenever the distribution of signals is not too far
from the independent case. This is a continuity result in the vein of Robert
(1990).52
Conditioning on extra information: Mezzetti (2004) considers a dif-
ferent informational environment: after the social alternative has been cho-
sen, and before monetary payments have been concluded, the agents observe
their payoff from the chosen alternative. Thus, agents receive information in
addition to their initial signals, and mechanisms should depend on this extra
information.
Mezzetti observes that an efficient mechanism can be implemented in two
stages: In stage 1, agents report their signals; based on the reports, the value
maximizing alternative is implemented. In stage 2, transfers are implemented
52Adding the possibility of an ex-post veto is also likely to invalidate such a possibility
result. See Compte and Jehiel (2004) for an exploration of such constraints in Myerson-
Satterthwaite’s model with correlated types.
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according to a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism based on reports about
the observed payoffs in the alternative chosen at stage 1. Assuming that
agents report honestly in stage 2, agents also have the right incentive to
report honestly in stage 1 because, given the VCG transfers at stage 2, their
objective coincides with the social welfare criterion
Mezzetti’s insight53 is valuable. But, the specific mechanism proposed
by Mezzetti suffers from a number of serious drawbacks. First, at stage 2,
agents are completely indifferent about their announcement, since it only
serves to compute the transfers received by others (the social alternative has
been already chosen at stage 1. This is in sharp contrast with the agents’
strictly positive incentive (due to the unresolved uncertainty about the chosen
alternative) to report their true types in the VCG mechanism in the private
values case. Second, in many applications, a significant amount of time may
elapse before the payoff attached to a chosen alternative is revealed to an
agent. Then, allowing for transfers that are contingent on information that
becomes available in a distant future seems impractical54.
5.4 Ex-post Implementation withoutWelfare Maximiza-
tion
Bayesian mechanism design has been criticized on the ground that both the
designer and the agents need a lot of information about the distribution of
the private signals in order to choose their best course of action55. Robust im-
plementation seeks for a stronger notion of implementation where the agents
and the designer do not need such precise information. In private value
contexts, this leads to consider dominant strategy implementation, whereas
the analogous concept for settings with informational externalities is ex-post
implementation56: Agents should find it optimal to report their true signals
even after learning the signals received by others. Such a notion is neces-
sary for robustness since implementation should be possible for any belief,
in particular for the degenerate belief that other agents’ signals are given
53Hansen (1985) is an early paper on auction with contingent payments in settings where
additional information becomes available.
54This issue pertains also to the celebrated lemons market in Akerlof (1970). Mezzetti’s
analysis suggests that there is no problem for the buyer and the seller to agree on the
price after the buyer observes quality (say after one year of driving a used car). But, our
opinion is that such mechanisms are fragile due to the noisy and subjective assessments
of quality, moral hazard, verifiability, etc....
55This is sometimes referred to as Wilson’s critique.
56This notion corresponds to the uniform equilibrium first defined by d’Aspremont and
Gerard Varet (1979), and to uniform incentive compatibility as defined by Holmstrom and
Myerson (1983). The term ex-post equilibrium is due to Cremer and McLean (1985).
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by a specific realization. It is also sufficient for robustness in quasi-linear
environments since ex-post implementation basically means that, whatever
their beliefs about others’ types, agents find it optimal to report their true
types whenever other agents are expected to report truthfully. These ideas
have been recently formalized by Bergemann and Morris (2005) 57
An immediate corollary of the main result in the previous section is
that, generically, the welfare-maximizing allocation cannot be robustly imple-
mented if there are multidimensional signals and informational externalities
(if it were, the welfare-maximizing Bayes-Nash implementation would be pos-
sible for any prior, including the independent case; but this was shown to be
false!)
In this Subsection we considerably strengthen the above insight by show-
ing that it extends to any deterministic social rule that makes use of the
agents’ reports. In our view, the resulting impossibility result casts a se-
rious doubt about the role of ex-post implementation as a form of robust
implementation. The analysis follows Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu,
and Zame (2005).
We focus on choice functions ψ : S → K, with the property that there
are transfers functions ti : S → R, such that truth-telling is an ex-post
equilibrium in the incomplete information game that is induced by the direct
revelation mechanism
¡
ψ, (ti)i∈N
¢
, i.e.
viψ(θ) (θ) + t
i (θ) ≥ vi
ψ
³eθi,θ−i´ (θ) + ti
³eθi, θ−i´ (23)
for all θi,eθi ∈ Θi and θ−i ∈ Θ−i. Such a choice rule ψ is said to be ex post
implementable. We call a choice function ψ trivial if it is constant on the
interior Θ of the type space.
By requiring optimality of i’s truth-telling for every realization of other
agents types θ−i, inequality (23) treats θ−i as if it was known to agent i. Her
incentive constraint is thus equivalent to a monopolistic screening problem
for every θ−i. Thus, the designer can post personalized prices pik (s
−i) for
the various alternatives, and let the individuals choose among them. In
equilibrium all agents must agree on a most favorable alternative:
Lemma 16 (Ex-Post Taxation Principle) A choice function ψ is ex post
implementable, if and only if for all i ∈ N , k ∈ K and s−i ∈ S−i, there are
transfers
¡
pik
¡
θ−i
¢¢
k
∈ (R ∪ {∞})N \ (∞, ....,∞) such that:
ψ (θ) ∈ argmax
k∈K
©
vik (θ)− pik
¡
θ−i
¢ª
. (24)
57See also Dasgupta, Hammond, Maskin, (1979) and Ledyard (1978) for early, related
arguments in private value frameworks.
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The difficulty of finding an ex-post implementable rule is that (24) should
be simultaneously satisfied for all agents i.
For illustration, we now reduce the problem by assuming that there are
only two agents, i = 1, 2 and two alternatives k, l. Because agents’ incentives
are only responsive to differences in payoffs, it is convenient to focus on
relative valuations58 µi and relative prices δi :
µi (θ) = vik (θ)− vil (θ)
δi
¡
θ−i
¢
= pik
¡
θ−i
¢
− pil
¡
θ−i
¢
Assuming, that relative prices δ are continuous, the taxation principle
implies that at a signal θ such that agent i is indifferent between the two
alternatives, agent j should also be indifferent (since they agree on the pre-
ferred alternative). That is,
µi (θ)− δi
¡
θ−i
¢
= 0⇔ µj (θ)− δj
¡
θ−j
¢
= 0 (25)
Assuming further that relative prices δ are differentiable, condition (25) im-
plies that the gradients of agents’s payoff functions must be parallel on the
indifference set (i.e., the set of signal profile where agents are indifferent
between the two alternatives). That is,µ
∇θiµi (θ)
∇θ−iµi (θ)−∇θ−iδi
¡
θ−i
¢ ¶ and µ ∇θiµ−i (θ)−∇θiδ−i ¡θi¢∇θ−iµ−i (θ)
¶
are parallel on the indifference set. (26)
For differentiable relative price functions, this implies:
Proposition 17 Let (ψ, t) be a non-trivial ex-post incentive compatible mech-
anism. If the relative transfers δi are differentiable for all i ∈ {1, 2} then,
there exist an indifference signal profile bθ, and a vector y (with the dimen-
sionality of θi) such that ∇θiµi (θ) and (∇θiµ−i (θ)− y) are parallel for every
indifference signal profile θ = (bθi, θ−i).
Jehiel et al. (2005) extend the above intuition to the case where the
relative price function is neither differentiable, nor continuous, and they show
that the above geometric condition cannot be generically59 satisfied. This
yields:
58For technical simplicity, we assume that relative valuations satisfy the mild require-
ment ∇θiµi (θ) 6= 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
59See Jehiel et al (2005) for precise notions of genericity in the infinite dimensional space
of preferences. The result holds for both topological and measure-theoretic notions.
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Theorem 18 (Jehiel et al. 2005) Assume that the dimension of the signal
θi is at least two for each agent i = 1, 2. Then, for generic preferences, only
trivial social choice rules are ex-post implementable.
For illustration, consider now a setting with bilinear valuations and two-
dimensional signals θi =
¡
θik, θ
i
l
¢
∈ [0, 1]2.
Example 19 Define valuations v by:
vik (θ) = a
i
kθ
i
k + b
i
kθ
i
kθ
−i
k = θ
i
k
¡
aik + b
i
kθ
−i
k
¢
vil (θ) = a
i
lθ
i
l + b
i
lθ
i
lθ
−i
l = θ
i
l
¡
ail + b
i
lθ
−i
l
¢
where aik, b
i
k, a
i
l, b
i
l 6= 0. Thus,
µi(θ) = aikθ
i
k − ailθil + bikθikθ−ik − bilθilθ−il .
For a vector y =
µ
yk
yl
¶
, we have
∇θiµi (θ) =
µ
aik + b
i
kθ
−i
k
−ail − bilθ−il
¶
(∇θiµ−i (θ)− y) =
µ
b−ik θ
−i
k − yk
−b−il θ−il − yl
¶
It is readily verified that b1l b
2
k − b1kb2l = 0 is necessary for such vectors to
remain parallel when we vary θ−ik and θ
−i
l . It follows from Proposition 17
that a non-trivial choice function ψ is implementable only if
b1l b
2
k − b1kb2l = 0. (27)
The above condition is obviously non-generic: the set of parameters where it
is satisfied has zero Lebesgue-measure in the 8-dimensional space of coeffi-
cients that parameterize the bi-linear valuations in this example.
Possibility results We now review several situations that allow for
non-trivial ex-post implementation. All of them result from settings where
the geometric condition displayed in Proposition 17 above is less restrictive.
1) Theorem 18 heavily relies on the impossibility of simultaneously satis-
fying the incentive constraints of several agents. If there is only one strategic
agent, non-trivial ex post implementation is possible. This should be con-
trasted with the impossibility of efficient Nash-Bayes implementation, which
holds as soon as at least one agent has multidimensional private information.
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2) If all agents have a one-dimensional signal60, or if only one agent has a
multi-dimensional signal then non-trivial ex post implementation is possible
for some open set of preferences (see Jehiel et al. 2005).
3) For some non-generic, yet interesting, preferences non-trivial ex post
implementation is possible.
3a) Consider preferences vik(θ) that are additively separable, i.e. v
i
k(θ) =
f ik(θ
i) + hik(θ
−i). It is readily verified by the standard VCG analysis that
argmaxk
X
i
f ik(θ
i) can be ex-post implemented. Under some technical con-
ditions, only such affine maximizers can be implemented (see Jehiel, Meyer-
ter-Vehn and Moldovanu, 2004). This is the counterpart to Roberts’ (1979)
result in the private values case.
3b) Another non generic but interesting class is studied by Bikchandani
(2004). He considers a one-object auction without allocative externalities and
observes that, by not selling the object for a sufficiently large subset of signals,
a non-trivial (yet very inefficient) choice rule can be ex-post implemented.
6 Conclusion
We have studied the effects of allocative and informational externalities in
auctions and related mechanisms. Because values become endogenous, stan-
dard auctions cease to be welfare maximizing in the presence of allocative
externalities, and they give rise to a wealth of new phenomena. But the
traditional Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms achieve welfare maximization
in such frameworks. Moreover, robust (not necessarily welfare maximizing)
implementation is generically possible only for a class of weighted Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanisms. Informational externalities can be satisfactorily
dealt with only in settings where signals are one-dimensional (and where
a single-crossing property holds). For example, an English ascending auc-
tion is welfare maximizing in one-object symmetric settings, and generalized
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are welfare- maximizing even in asym-
metric settings as long as signals are scalars. The situation drastically
changes when information is multidimensional (as required by general multi-
object applications): robust welfare maximization is generically impossible.
We hope that the above survey has shown that externalities naturally
arising in many applications have a significant effect on the outcome of auc-
tions and other mechanisms. From an empirical viewpoint, it is now time to
investigate the role (magnitude and effect on bidding strategies) of alloca-
60In this case, the geometric condition merely requires that some scalars (rather than
vectors) are multiples of each other
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tive externalities in auctions - this could parallel the exciting recent work on
common value auctions (see Athey and Haile, 2005).
From a theoretical viewpoint, the above analysis leaves open a number
of important questions. In particular, since informational externalities make
it impossible to implement the welfare-maximizing allocation, how does the
second-best allocation look like in such contexts? Since ex-post implementa-
tion is generally impossible with informational externalities, what is a good
way to achieve robust implementation? What are the pros and the cons of re-
sale markets, in contexts with externalities ? Finally, the difficulties posed by
multidimensional signals hampered advances also in contexts without exter-
nalities: how does the revenue-maximizing auction for multiple, heterogenous
objects looks like ?
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